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COMMENTS
BROKERAGE FIRM'S LIABILITY FOR SALESMAN'S
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
"The business of trading in securities is one in which opportunities for dis-
honesty are of constant recurrence and ever present."' In a special report
issued in 1963, the Securities and Exchange Commission noted that the recent
influx of inexperienced salesmen or "customer's men,"2 together with a steady
increase in the number of new and unsophisticated investors, has created special
problems for the various government agencies responsible for protecting the
investing public.3 When fraudulent conduct occurs, often the active wrongdoer
is not a partner or other member of high management in a brokerage firm but a
salesman employed by the firm.4
Many brokerage firms, unfortunately, emphasize sales potential over ability
to offer sound investment advice.' Consequently, few firms impose "conditions
of character or competence upon employment as a salesman." Most firms,
moreover, pay on a commission basis, and when salary adjustments and
promotion opportunities depend on high production, the danger of "churning'"
or "overpricing"' is understandably increased."
1. Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943).
2. Between 1950 and 1962, the number of customer's men registered with the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) increased from 28,794 to over 100,000. Jackson,
Stock Broker's Liability Under Customs, Usages, and Rules, 12 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 111
(1963).
3. I SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities & Exchange
Commission 47 (1963) [Hereinafter cited as Special Study]. The SEC was especially
critical of the "whiz kids of finance," the account executives or customer's men, who work
short hours and reap large salaries after six months training. Id. at 94.
4. E.g., Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943); Rosenberg
v. Hano, 121 F2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941); Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.DN.Y. 1955);
Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), alI'd, 113 F.2d 988 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960).
S. Special Study at 99.
6. Id. at 115.
7. "Churning" is causing an unreasonable amount of purchases and sales in a client's
account "in order to obtain profits or commissions . . . contrary to the best interest of the
customer." Loomis, Enforcement Problems Under the Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus.
Lawyer 665, 676 (1959). See generally Cohn, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
1340 (1966). For examples of churning see Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass
1955); Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960); Looper & Co., 38 S.E.C. 294 (1958);
Thomson & McKinnon, 35 S.E.C. 451 (1953).
8. "Overpricing" is simply charging more than the market price of the stock. Eg,
Weber-Millican & Co., 35 S.E.C. 663 (1954), aff'd, 222 F2d 822 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 947 (1956); Charles Hughes & Co., 13 S.E.C. 676, aff'd, 139 Fad 434 (2d
Cir. 1943); William J. Stelmack Corp., 11 S.E.C. 601 (1942).
9. Special Study at 254.
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I. APPLICATION OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
Both the Securities Act of 193310 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193411
met with opposition from the securities industry. It was the fear of many that
the broad coverage of the civil liability sections would shackle the economy by
unduly inhibiting business transactions. 12 In striking a balance between this
fear and the necessity of protecting the public,13 Congress inserted, as adjuncts
to the general anti-fraud provisions of each statute,14 a section that rendered a
"controlling person" liable for the misconduct of the parties he controlled. 15
10. 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
11. 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964).
12. See, e.g., 73 Cong. Rec. 8283 (1934) ; id. at 3058; 73 Cong. Rec. 3801 (1933).
13. "To require them [directors, as one example of controlling persons] to guarantee the
absolute accuracy of every statement that they are called upon to make, would be ... to
fall afoul of the . .. [desire] that the protection of the public should be achieved with the
least possible interference to honest business." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1933). "The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least
possible interference to honest business." 73 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933) (message from the
President).
When the 1933 Act was still in committee, the Senate version called for an insurer's or
absolute liability for controlling parties, whereas the House version afforded a controlling
person the opportunity to exonerate himself from liability upon a showing that he could not
reasonably have been expected to know of the wrongdoing of the controlled party. H.R.
Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933). The ultimate acceptance of the House version
(see note 15 infra) left little doubt that Congress intended to alleviate controlling parties
from a strict application of respondeat superior. But see Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen
& Co., [1964-1966 transfer binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91565, at 95134 (S.D. Cal.
1964), discussed in text and accompanying notes 53-56 infra.
14. In the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964),
section 11 imposes liability for a materially misleading or defective registration statement,
48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). Section 12(e) imposes liability on
anyone who offers or sells a security in violation of the registration requirements of the Act.
48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964). Section 12(2) imposes liability
on anyone who offers or sells a security by means of a material misstatement or omission.
48 Stat. 84 (1933) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
In the Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78h-1 (1964),
section 10b makes it unlawful "directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or Instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange-(a) to effect a short sale . . . . (b) to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tion as the Commission may prescribe . . . ." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78] (1964).
This section must be read in conjunction with its corresponding rule, 10(b)-5, which makes
it unlawful: "(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary In order
to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
15. In the 1933 Act, section 770 provides: "Every person who ...controls any person
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These controlling persons sections permit a buyer to "pierce the 'privity' re-
quirement.., to the extent of reaching.. controlling persons," 10 subject to a
"special defense which varies in the two statutes."'17 Generally speaking, this
defense would exempt a controlling person from liability if he were both unin-
volved in the illegal transaction and acting in good faith throughout. 8
Since it is clear that the relationship between a brokerage firm and its sales-
men is one of controlling person to controlled person,' 9 it would appear that if
the firm is to be held liable for the wrongdoing of one of its salesmen the source
of this liability should rest in an application of a controlling person section. To
hold a passive, legitimate broker -° liable under the general anti-fraud provisions
renders the controlling persons sections superfluous, and thereby deprives the
firm of the defenses that these sections afford. To employ the doctrine of
respondeat superior to hold the firm liable not only ignores precedent to the
effect that the customer's man "cannot be regarded as a general agent'
but renders the defenses of the controlling persons sections nugatory. Yet, the
liable under sections 77k or 771 [the anti-fraud sections] of this title shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person . . . is liable,
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist." 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
Section 20 of the 1934 Act provides that "Every person who, directly or indirectly,
controls any person liable under any provision of this title ... shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person ... unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts con-
stituting the violation or cause of action." 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78t
(1964).
16. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1704 (2d ed. 1961).
17. Id. at 1808.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. E.g., Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (ED. Pa. 1966); Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v.
Kamen & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. E 91565, at 95134 (S.D.
Cal. 1964). It has been held that the statutory "control" should be interpreted liberally.
Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 275 (10th Cir. 1957); Zachman v. Erwin,
186 F. Supp. 681, 685 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
20. The legitimate broker is to be distinguished from the operator of a "boiler room."
One description of such an operation is "specialization in one stock, use of misleading
brochures, a large volume of sales over the long distance telephone, and lack of knowledge
or disclosure of the real condition of the company." Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116, 117 (2d
Cir. 1961). For further discussion of the "boiler room" see Special Study at 265-68; Note,
72 Yale L.J. 1411-16 (1963). See also Mac Robbins & Co., 40 S.E.C. 497 (1961); Best
Securities Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960).
21. C. Meyer, The Law of Stockbrokers & Stock Exchanges 482 (1931). "Nor is it
within the scope of his duties to warrant the value of stock which he sells .. !' Id. at 483.
For further examples of the limitations on the scope of the customer's man's authority, see
New England Trust Co. v. Farr., 57 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1932); Bosak v. Parish, 252 N.Y.
212, 169 N.E. 280 (1929); Oppenheimer v. Irvin, 166 App. Div. 233, 151 N.Y.S. 54 (3d
Dep't 1915).
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courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission have in several instances
adopted each of these approaches.
Although it did not involve a broker-salesman relationship, Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane2 2 is one of the most influential decisions in this area.
Here, the perpetrator of the fraud was a wire correspondent," named Waddy,
who used the broker's facilities. Merrill Lynch supplied Waddy with various
office materials (e.g., rubber stamps, forms, publications), and generally per-
mitted "the prominent display of its name" 24 by Waddy. The Commission
found2 5 that the natural result of this was that investors who dealt with Waddy
thought they were dealing with Merrill Lynch,2 6 and that Merrill Lynch "should
have been aware of the fact that Waddy's customers were of the opinion that
they were in reality dealing with it. '" 27 The Commission concluded that the
firm's failure
to rectify the features of its relationship with Waddy that formed the means for
abuse by him must be deemed to have contributed effectively to Waddy's ability to
defraud the customers. . . . [Merrill Lynch's] course of business thus indirectly
"operated as a fraud or deceit . . . and constituted a violation . . . of Section 10(b)
[of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] . . . and Rule X-1OB-5 thereunder.128
It is important to note that the Commission made no reference to the controlling
persons section. 29
The decision is certainly reconcilable with rule X-10b-5, which the Com-
mission has promulgated. Specifically, this rule makes it "unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . . (c) to engage in any course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . . 3 The
Commission apparently deemed the firm's failure to apprise Waddy's customers
that Waddy was not representing the firm to be itself a violation of rule
X-10b-5. In this view, the nature of the relationship between Waddy and
Merrill Lynch would be irrelevent.
22. 31 S.E.C. 494 (1950).
23. A wire correspondent is a broker who uses the wire facilities of a major firm to
complete his transactions.
24. 31 S.E.C. at 496.
25. A violation of one of the anti-fraud provisions, in addition to giving the defrauded
party a cause of action, subjects the broker to revocation of his registration by the SEC.
The Merrill Lynch case was such a revocation proceeding. See note 62 infra.
26. 31 S.E.C. at 497.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 498.
29. The Commission stated that "it is not necessary for the purposes of these proceedings
to determine whether the relationship between respondent and Waddy was technically one
of principal and agent so as to make appropriate the application of the doctrine of respondeat
superior." Id. at 497 n.3. This would indicate that the Commission did not deem the
control sections as negating respondeat superior if a principal-agent relationship were
found. Such a view would appear to be contrary to the intent of Congress in passing the
statutes. See note 13 supra.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
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It seems, however, that the Commission deemed the relationship betveen
Merrill Lynch and Waddy to be one of controlling person to controlled person a1
Further, the Commission stated that the firm "was under a duty to exercise a
high degree of vigilance to prevent injury to ... [the customers of Waddy].'2
Thus, it may well be that a latent consideration in this decision was the control
relationship, or, more specifically, a breach of an apparent duty to prevent the
fraud of a controlled person. In this view, it is the firm's status as a controlling
person that connected it with the illegal transaction so as to bring its conduct
within the ambit of rule X-10b-5 and thus within section 10(b).33
But the very existence of the controlling persons sections would appear to
indicate that it was Congress' intention, in such cases, to test the firm's liability
under these sections. Since the Commission made no mention of the controlling
persons section, it is clear that the decision should not be used as a precedent for
finding liability under that section, as it later was.34 Instead, reference should be
made to it only when a firm's actions are themselves so tainted as to render them
liable under the general anti-fraud provisions.
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions have found brokerage firms liable under
section 10(b) when there was little more basis for such liability than the firm's
control relationship to the active wrongdoer. Thus, in R.I. Johnson & Co.,3
a salesman in a branch office3O churned a client's account. The SEC pointed out
31. The Commission referred to Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85
F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949), a civil case arising from the same transaction, in which
a district court found the firm liable under the controlling persons section of the Exchange
Act. 31 S.E.C. at 497 n.3.
32. Id. at 497.
33. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of certain securities, any deceptive device in contravention of the rules. 48 Stat. 891 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
34. On the facts of the Merrill Lynch proceeding, it should be noted, the firm apparently
would not have been exonerated even if the controlling persons sections had been applied.
Thus, in Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark.
1949), an action by the buyer on the same facts, the court held that the firm had violated
section 20 (the controlling persons section) of the Exchange Act. The finding of a section
20 violation was predicated on the theory that the firm's failure to supervise constituted
"inducing" the correspondent's misconduct, thereby negating the availability of the section
20 defense. Id. at 123. It is arguable that the term "induce" in section 20 requires some
affirmative action by the controlling person. But even if this is not the case, the Commis-
sion's failure to mention the section is not excused by the fact that its application would
have yielded the same holding. It will be seen that the Commission's neglect of the con-
trolling persons sections has not always had inconsequential results.
35. 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 231 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 844 (1956). In this case a widow was defrauded by a salesman whose name, aptly
enough, was Sharpe. For another decision involving the same Mr. Sharpe, see R.H. Johnson
& Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952).
36. The existence of branch offices presents great control or supervisory problems for
the larger firms, as the distance between the branch and home office makes central super-
vision impractical. The branch manager, while being responsible for the supervision of all
1967]
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that the firm's permanent records were kept in New York, and details of each
branch transaction were sent to the New York office on a daily basis. Unfortu-
nately for the firm, these records were never reviewed. Since the firm was put
"'on notice of the need for effective corrective measures to prevent overtrad-
ing . . .37 but failed to implement such measures, the SEC concluded that it
had "willfully violated . . . the Securities Act and . . . the Exchange Act."3 8'
As in Merrill Lynch, which Johnson did not cite, there was present a
lack of supervision and notice to the brokerage firm that something was "going
on." Again, however, there was no mention of the controlling person provisions
and the defenses that they provide.
Both Johnson and Merrill Lynch were relied upon in Reynolds & Co.,8 9
which involved fraudulent acts of salesmen in four of the respondent's branch
offices. These acts varied from churning accounts40 to forging customers' signa-
tures. In each instance the management of the firm had been put on notice of
the wrongdoing but had failed to take corrective action. The SEC ruled that:
"where the failure of a securities firm and its responsible personnel to maintain
and diligently enforce a proper system of supervision and internal control re-
sults in the perpetration of fraud upon customers or in other misconduct in wil-
ful violation of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act . . . such failure consti-
tutes participation in such misconduct, and wilful violations are committed not
only by the person who performed the misconduct but also by those who did
not properly perform their duty to prevent it."4 1
In referring to Merrill Lynch, Reynolds noted that "customers were led to
believe that they were in reality dealing with the [firm] . . . . Under these
circumstances we held that the failure of the registrant adequately to supervise
... contributed to the ability of the correspondent to defraud customers and thus
indirectly operated as a fraud or deceit on customers in violation of Section
10(b) .... ,,42 This language could be interpreted so as to indicate that
Reynolds deemed Merrill Lynch to turn on the fact that the firm failed to
disclose the true nature of its relationship with the correspondent. It has already
been suggested that this is the only proper justification for Merrill Lynch.
In Lorenz v. Watson43 the viable remnants of the controlling persons sections
were effectively rendered impotent. There the plaintiff-buyer sought recovery
from the defendant-firm for churning by the defendant's salesman. Plaintiff
expressly alleged liability under the control section of the Exchange Act.44 In
salesman in his branch, is also charged with the task of increasing sales in his particular
territory. Often these responsibilities conflict. See Special Study at 291-96.
37. 36 S.E.C. at 486.
38. Id. at 487.
39. 39 S.E.C. 902 (1960). This case has been termed the leading case on the problem of
supervision. Special Study at 290.
40. See note 7 supra.
41. 39 S.E.C. at 917.
42. Id. at 917 n.30.
43. 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
44. Id. at 728.
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denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court ruled that: "to satisfy the
requirement of good faith [a control section defense] it is necessary for the
defendants to show that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent
the injury suffered."45 The Lorenz court then cited Reynolds for the proposition
that where a firm's failure to maintain a proper system of supervision results in
a fraud upon a customer, "'wilful violations are committed not only by the
person who performed the misconduct but also by those who did not perform
their duty to prevent it.' "46 Lorenz concluded that failure of the brokerage firm
to prevent the fraudulent conduct of its employees is sufficient to support an
action under section 10(b).47
The ruling in Lorenz that invocation of the good faith defense of the control-
ling persons sections requires a showing of a system of supervision and internal
control is novel. When the Reynolds case discussed liability for failure to
supervise, it referred to liability under the general anti-fraud provisions, not
the controlling persons sections. 48 Moreover, Reynolds predicated the brokerage
firm's liability on its failure to maintain proper supervision and to inquire into
questionable conduct of its employees which had already come to its attention.49
Even if its resort to the general anti-fraud provisions were justified, arguably,
Reynolds holds that a failure to supervise or inquire constitutes a violation only
when such failure occurs in the face of indications that misconduct was actually
transpiring. Lorenz, on the other hand, seems to hold that affirmative supervision
is an absolute prerequisite for avoidance of liability under the general anti-fraud
sections or the controlling persons sections. The Lorenz court noted that: "A
contrary ruling would substantially diminish the protection afforded by Section
20 of the Act, and would amount to an invitation to avoid the burden and
responsibility of supervising the activities of one's employees."1*° It would seem,
moreover, that Reynolds properly included causation as an element of liability,
i.e., but for the non-supervision no fraud would have occurred. 1 LorenZ' ruling
that a showing of supervision is a prerequisite to a successful defense, however,
would appear to negate causation as a necessary element of liability. 2
Whereas Lorenz substantially narrows the gap through which a brokerage
firm may escape liability for misconduct by its employees, the earlier case of
Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co.0 attempted to eliminate it completely.
45. Id. at 732.
46. Id. at 733.
47. Id.
48. Although Merrill Lynch did mention a duty to use care to prevent injury, its
reference to that duty was not made in the context of the controlling persons section. See
note 27 supra and accompanying text.
49. 39 S.E.C. at 916.
50. 258 F. Supp. at 733.
51. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
52. This negation of causation is in direct conflict with Congressional intent. "The mere
existence of control is not made a basis for liability unless that control is effectively exer-
cised to bring about the action upon which liability is based." 78 Cong. Rec. 8185 (1934).
53. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91565, at 95134 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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Here, the court expressly exonerated the defendant firm5 4 from liability under
both controlling persons sections on the ground that it had come within the
defenses that the sections provide. But, the court went on to say that although
"the defendant ... and its partners are not liable under the controlling persons
provisions ... [they] are liable to plaintiff by reason of the fact that their
employees perpetrated the fraud . . .while acting within the scope of their
employment and in exercise of their ostensible authority."55 The Aschkar court
cited no authority for its application of respondeat superior, and apparently was
unconcerned with the fact that the application of the doctrine to brokerage
firms would not only render the control sections virtually meaningless, but
would, in the usual case, render any discussion of supervision irrelevant.,,
Resort to respondeat superior in determining a brokerage firm's liability for the
acts of its employees, moreover, lacks foundation in the terms of the statute and
in its legislative history.
II. SEC SUPERVISION REQUIREMENTS
Since "proper supervision" is what the Commission and the courts apparently
look for in considering whether a firm will escape liability, the remaining
discussion will assume, arguendo, that such affirmative duty does exist. In that
light, there follows an examination of what supervisory measures will suffice as
performance of the duty.
57
The duty to prevent employee misconduct is based on the "shingle theory."
That is, like the attorney or physican, the broker warrants to the public that
he is an expert in his field and can be trusted more than the average merchant
attempting to sell goods.58 Since the broker attempts to convey, and profits
54. The fraudulent scheme in this case was based on the basic "chain letter" device. The
defendant's employee would persuade B to buy a stock from A (which he had persuaded
A to buy) by assuring B that C would buy from him at a higher price. The employee
would then phone C and induce him to buy it from B by assuring that he could sell It to
D. The employee would induce D, etc.
55. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fi 91565, at 95139 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
56. Compare Merrill Lynch where respondeat superior was held not applicable. See note
29 supra.
57. One commentator has stated: "that a broker-dealer violates the anti-fraud pro-
visions when his employees engage in misconduct which violates the ...provisions of the
act and the broker-dealer did not perform his duty to prevent such misconduct." Cohen &
Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The Importance of Administrative Ad-
judication in their Development, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 691, 705 (1964).
58. "The essence of this theory is that in certain circumstances one who sells securities
to the public-who hangs out his shingle-emplicitly warrants the soundness of state-
ments. . . .When such a person conceals known information inconsistent with this 'implicit
warranty of soundness' he has omitted a material fact without which the statements made
would be misleading." Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961). See also 3 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1490 (2d ed. 1961); C. Meyer, The Law of Stockbrokers and
Stockexchanges 265-67 (1931). For example, if a broker is being paid to advise clients to
buy by one anxious to sell a stock, he must disclose this fact to the buyer. SEC v. Torr, 15
F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937). In
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by this image of trust, he must also bear the duties that accompany it.rl The
result is a "higher standard of fair dealing than is found in almost any other
field of buying and selling."c' °
In Thompson & McKinnon6' the SEC, in deciding on the possible revocation
of a brokerage firm's registration, 62 noted with approval that subsequent to
the start of the proceeding, the firm had set up the following controls: (1) it
specified a number of transactions that could be legitimately completed in any
one account (if the customer insisted on exceeding this limit, the account
would be dosed); (2) it required the preparation of a monthly analysis, to be
reviewed by a partner, showing the amount of trading in each account and the
commissions derived from each account; and (3) it required branch managers
to make a daily review of all transactions6 3
In Bond & Goodwin InC.,64 the SEC called for a review of all incoming and
outgoing correspondence, 65 close scrutiny of trading tickets to insure the correct
price was being charged,66 and a daily review of all buying and selling prices
of each salesman.67 In E. H. Rollins & Sons Inc.,68 after the institution of
Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961), the firm predicted a stock would rise IS
points, and true to the prediction, it did. Even so, the SEC attempted to revoke its
registration claiming that since there was no adequate basis for the prediction, the firm had
breached its duty.
59. Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 214, 240 (1959).
60. Id. at 240. See generally Levin & Evan, Professionalism and the Stockbroker, 21
Bus. Lawyer 337, 338-39 (1966).
61. 35 S.E.C. 451 (1953).
62. Under Section 15(b) of the Securities & Exchange Act the Commisson may revoke
the broker's registration if it finds that such a penalty is in the public interest. If it feels
the punishment is not warranted, even though it has decided an infraction existed, it can, in
its discretion, decline to apply it. 78 Stat. 570, 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(5) (1964).
63. 35 S.E.C. at 460. The monthly review would be a task of formidable proportions.
For example, a partner in a firm like Merrill Lynch would have to review the transactions
of over 2,000 salesmen. Special Study at 22. The firm of Kidder & Peabody has almost 300
salesmen and completes 1,500 transactions a day. Id. at 294. Also, requiring a branch manager,
in addition to his sales and administration duties, personally to examine each transaction
daily, is quite burdensome.
64. 15 S.E.C. 584 (1944). In this case the defense of lack of knowledge of the fraudulent
acts was raised, together with assertions that the firm "employed intelligent, experienced
men, and relied on their judgment." Id. at 599. The Commission noted that the firm had
failed to have incoming mail directed to the attention of particular employees, interrupted
and read, to have an officer of the firm personally review each piece of outgoing mail, and
to screen all long distance calls and telegrams. Id.
65. Id. at 599-600.
66. Id. at 600.
67. Id.
68. 18 S.E.C. 347 (1945). This case held that a broker might be liable for fraudulent
acts even where the victim, in this case a religious organization, has knowledge of, or pur-
ported to authorize the acts. Id. Accord, Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941).
The Commission recognized that in a large organization many transactions would neces-
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the proceeding, the firm submitted a proposed set of new supervisory controls
which were accepted by the Commission. One of these required that all letters
written by salesmen be reviewed, before mailing, "by a person designated by
the vice president in charge." 69 Another control required that copies of all
letters written by branch managers be forwarded to the home office for review.70
The necessary supervision, before the broker will be exonerated, entails more
than management review, however. It must include affirmative instruction to
members of the staff to watch for, and report, any irregularities. In RB.
Johnson & Co.,71 the firm was held responsible for the salesman's acts since,
among other things, the branch manager was not instructed to check for
excessive trading.72 He was told to "watch out" for anything irregular, but he
was not specifically instructed on how to discover churning.7a
The SEC,7 4 in its Special Study, has also discussed the creation, by the
broker, of a separate department in the brokerage firm, the sole function of which
would be to investigate and prevent fraudulent practices. 75 The SEC has also
advocated the implementation of "surprise audits" in which a team of firm
auditors would, without notice, appear at a branch office and insure that the
office is utilizing proper detection procedures, 70 and a more extensive use of
electronic data processing for closer review of all the firm's transactions."1
sarily be carried on by subordinates, and that it would be virtually impossible for
management to be aware of everything that transpired. It concluded that it was imperative
that adequate controls be initiated so that any irregularity would be discovered. 18 S.E.C.
at 391.
69. Id. at 395. The Commission did not specify who was to check on the person so
designated.
70. Id.
71. 36 S.E.C. 467 (1955). See also note 35 supra.
72. 36 S.E.C. at 481.
73. Id. at 482. The Commission has also specifically called for certain records to be kept:
"A daily journal should be kept recording all purchases and sales of securities with certificate
numbers, all receipts and disbursements of cash, and all other debits and credits. Ledger
accounts should be maintained for each cash and each margin account of every customer
and of the broker or dealer and its partners or officers, as well as ledger accounts for all
asset, liability, income, expense, and capital accounts. A separate record should be main-
tained for each security as of the clearance dates showing all 'long' and all 'short'
positions .... A memorandum should be kept of each brokerage order whether executed or
unexecuted, and a memorandum of each purchase and sale for the account of the broker or
dealer." Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors Act of
1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 214, 238 n.74 (1959).
74. For a critical discussion of the SEC's problems in effectively regulating Its "own
shop" see Cary, Administrative Agencies and the Securities & Exchange Commission, 29
Law & Contemp. Prob. 653, 653-54 (1964); Jennings, Self Regulation in the Securities
Industry, The Role of the Securities & Exchange Commission, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob.
663, 664-65 (1964).
75. Special Study at 293-94.
76. Id. at 296.
77. Id. at 295.
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III. CONCLUSION
In view of the detailed nature of the controls approved by the SEC, it is
difficult to imagine how any misconduct can occur undetected. If each trans-
action is reviewed on a daily basis, if each customer's account is reviewed
monthly to ascertain the amount of trading and resulting commissions, if all
correspondence is constantly checked, and if all trading tickets are reviewed
to insure proper charging, it would appear virtually impossible for a salesman
to act outside the cognizance of his employer.
As a practical matter, a brokerage firm cannot escape liability for fraudulent
acts of its salesmen.7 8 Judicial and administrative interpretation of the con-
trolling persons sections of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act has
resulted in a stringent standard of liability.7 9 A showing of affirmative super-
vision has emerged as a requisite to a successful defense by a firm in an action
for the fraud of its employees. The exercise of such supervision as the SEC
deems adequate would virtually preclude the occurrence of fraud by a salesman
without the broker's knowledge. The mere occurrence of fraud, moreover,
might raise the presumption of a lack of adequate supervision.
78. It is interesting to note that while a broker is responsible for his employee's act
because he "controls" him, an Exchange is not liable for misconduct of the member firm,
even though it has a duty to police the broker. In Baird v. Franklin, 141 Fad 238 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), plaintiff sued the New York Stock Exchange for
failing to properly supervise a member firm whose misconduct injured the plaintiff. The
court stated "we can see no substantial resemblance between the duties of bailees or
other fiduciaries and those of the stock exchange." 141 F.2d at 239. Whether this will continue
to be the rule is questionable as traditional immunities of the Exchange are under heavy
fire in the courts. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), where, for
the first time, a court held that the antitrust laws apply to the stock exchanges. For a
detailed discussion of this point, see Jennings, The New York Exchange and the Commission
Rate Struggle, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 1119 (1965); Orrick, The Recent Erosion of Certain Anti-
trust Exemptions, 10 Antitrust Bull. 667, 677-78 (1965).
79. For instances in which federal courts have ignored the controlling persons sections,
see, e.g., SEC v. Rapp, 304 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1962); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F2d 112 (2d Cir.
1961); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 US. 786
(1944); Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941); Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466
(D.C. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 US. 705 (1940).
